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COMMENT 
CHALLENGES TO ESTABLISHING 
JURISDICTION OVER HOLOCAUST 
ERA CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURT 
I take no position regarding whether these cases were cor-
rectly decided, or whether they would even apply here. In-
stead, I cite them as a reality check for those objectors who 
believe that strong moral claims are easily converted into suc-
cessfullegal causes of action. l 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine: sometime in the future, a law student in America 
finds a letter written in 1944 by her Austrian grandmother to 
her grandfather far away. The letter says that Nazi agents 
have broken into the grandmother's home and taken away her 
gold watch and a painting by Picasso. The letter says that if 
the stolen items are recovered, they should be given to the 
grandchildren. The next day, the law student goes to an exhi-
bition at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art and sees 
the Picasso mentioned in her grandmother's letter. The stu-
dent learns that the Austrian Government owns the painting. 
Can she sue the Austrian government in federal court to re-
cover this canvas? 2 This question will be answered when the 
Supreme Court decides Altmann v. Austria in June 2004.3 
1 Judge Korman, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 
148 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
2 In 2002, Thomas Bennigson, the heir of original owners of a Picasso work 
entitled "Femme en Blanc" and a law student at Boalt Hall, filed suit in California 
state court in Los Angeles seeking to recover the painting which had hung on his 
grandmother's wall in Berlin before the war. The California state trial court dismissed 
the suit, holding that it should be filed in Chicago, where the current owner resides. As 
this Comment explains further, the outcome could have been different if the current 
owner was not an American resident but a foreign government. See: 
159 
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In December 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cided Altmann v. Austria.4 In this case, plaintiff Maria 
Altmann sued the Austrian government in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California to recover 
six paintings by Gustav Klimt5 that had once belonged to her 
family. 6 These canvases, one of which is the famous Portrait of 
Adele Bloch-Bauer (the plaintiffs aunt), had allegedly been 
obtained in violation of international law by the Austrian Na-
tional Gallery.7 They were stolen by the Nazis during the war.8 
Three years after Germany's defeat, the paintings were expro-
priated by the Austrian government.9 The Austrian govern-
ment demanded that the Altmanns donate six paintings to the 
National Gallery before it would permit them to remove the 
rest of their art collection from the country.lO 
Defendant, the Republic of Austria, filed a motion to dis-
miss the suit on a number of grounds. 11 Austria contended that 
as a foreign state it is immune from the jurisdiction of federal 
and state courts in the United States.12 The district court de-
nied Austria's motion to dismiss and the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
its decision.13 Austria then appealed the Ninth Circuit's ruling 
to the Supreme COurt.14 
hnp://www.chicagotribune.comlfeatureslchi -reich-picas so-story ,0, I 245488.story?coll=chi-site-nav , 
http://sfgate.comlcgi-binlarticle.cgi?file=lchroniclelarchivel2002l12127fBAI27626.DTL 
3 Martha Lufkin, Supreme Court to decide whether Austria can be sued in the 
US. The Art Newspaper.com, at 
http://www.theartnewspaper.comlnewslarticle.asp?idart= 11406. 
4 Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 
5 Nicolas Pioch, Klimt, Gustav, WebMueseum, Paris, at 
http://www.ibiblio.orglwmlpainUauthlklimU (Aug 19 2002). 
6 Altmann, 317 F.3d 954. 
7Id. 
B Raphael Rubinstein, Schiele & Klimt: Holocaust Heirs Battle On. (Court battles 
to determine rightful ownership of paintings by Egon Schiele and Gustav Klimt) (Brief 
Article), Art in America, at 
http://www.findarticles.comlcCdlslmI248110_88166306817/pllarticle.jhtml (October 
2002). 
9 Altman V. Austria, Complaint for Damages, page 3 at 
http://www.adele.aUComplaint_against_AustrialComplaint_against_Austria.pdf. 
10 Altman v. Austria, Complaint for Damages, page 3 at 
http://www.adele.aUComplaint_against_AustrialComplaint_against_Austria.pdf. 
11 Ashley Yarchin, Brief on Republic of Austria, et. at. V. Altmann, Maria, at 
http://journalism.medill.northwestern.eduldockeUaction.lasso?-database=docket&-
layout=lasso&-response=%2fdocket%2fdetail.srch&-recordID=33196&-search (last 
visited March 12, 2004). 
12 Altmann, 317 F.3d 954. 
13 Altmann V. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
14 Altmann, 317 F.3d 954. 
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The Court will consider only one issue: whether the Fed-
eral Sovereign Immunities Act (hereinafter "FSIA"), which al-
lows suits against foreign nations in U.S. courts only under 
certain exceptions, applies retroactively to crimes that took 
place before the Act was passed in 1976.15 Altmann brought 
her suit under one of these exceptions, namely, misappropria-
tion of property in violation of internationallaw.16 The Court's 
decision may affect the United States' relationships with other 
nations because its decision will determine whether foreign 
governments will face suits in federal courts for other Holo-
caust Era crimes.17 
This Comment contends that jurisdiction over Austria 
cannot be established retroactively by application of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act. The purpose of this Comment 
is to call the attention of the legal community and the general 
public to the need to resolve the remaining Holocaust Era 
claims. Many U.S. citizens fought to preserve democratic 
rights during the Second World War. Many gave their lives to 
protect the world from fascism. Now it is time for the legisla-
ture and the judiciary to complete this noble task. This Com-
ment is divided into four parts. Part I provides a brief over-
view of Holocaust litigation in the United States and a sum-
mary of the Altmann case. 1S Part II explains FSIA's application 
and the legal principles of retroactivity.19 Part III presents the 
district court's interpretation of FSIA in Altmann.2o Part IV 
explores the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision as well as 
15 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S.Ct. 46 (2003). 
16 Marcia Coyle, Battle Ouer Klimt paintings has Broad Implications, The Re-
corder, February 5, 2004, page 3; Marcia Coyle, A Case of Art and Law, The National 
Law Journal, at http://www.law.comijsp/nljlPubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1075219841543 
(Feb. 2, 2004). 
17 In recent years, an increasing number of U.S. citizens have turned to the fed-
eral courts seeking remedies for injuries that occurred in another nation or that were 
the fault of another nation. Like Altmann's clainl against Austria, a number of them 
stem from the World War II era. Thus, the same legal issue is at the heart of three 
other Holocaust Era cases: Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 
332 F.3d 173 (2"" Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3154 (Aug. 19, 2003) 
(No. 03-284); Garb v. Republic of Poland, 72 Fed. Appx. 850 (2"" Cir. 2003); petition for 
cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3268 (Sep., 30, 2003) (No. 03-500); Whiteman v. Federal Repub-
lic of Austria, No. 00 Civ. 8006 (S.D.N.Y. 2002 Oct. 21, 2002), which was consolidated 
with Garb. 
18 See supra p. 3. 
19 See supra p. 15. 
20 See supra p. 20. 
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the underlying decision of the district COurt.21 Finally, Part V 
critiques the Ninth Circuit's decision, asserting that it was 
made on improper legal grounds and proposes that the matter 
has to be resolved in the interest of public policy.22 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. HOLOCAUST ERA LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
This Comment does not intend to give a complete account 
of Holocaust Era wrongs and their adjudication. In order to 
provide a historical background to the Altmann case, however, 
it is necessary to explain how the Holocaust Era claims have 
been resolved and why Altmann was filed in the United States 
Court approximately sixty years after the alleged events oc-
curred. 
1. Post-World War II International Treaties and Reparation 
Agreements Precluded Private Litigation 
Since 1945, the United States has been a party to numer-
ous treaties and agreements addressing World War II repara-
tions.23 Treaties establishing peace with Germany and settling 
Nazi-era claims mandated that claims be handled on a gov-
ernment to government basis.24 Reparation claims arising out 
of World War II have always been subject to resolution by the 
political branches.25 In each case where courts established that 
a Holocaust Era claim was covered by a reparation treaty or by 
a compensation program, they abstained from adjudicating the 
claim.26 When World War II ended, the Allies sought repara-
tions for victims of the Nazi regime by seizing German assets, 
which they transferred to countries devastated by the Nazis.27 
21 See supra p. 23. 
22 See supra p. 26. 
23 Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa, 65 F.Supp.2d 248, 265-272 (D.N.J. 1999); In re 
Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants, 129 F. Supp.2d 370, 376 (D.N.J. 2001); 
Anderman v. Austria, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1098,1113, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
24 See Burger·Fischer, 65 F.Supp.2d at 279; Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. 
Supp. 2d 484, 461 (D.N.J. 1999). 
25 Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. at 484·486. 
26 Burger.Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 279; [warwwa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 461. 
27 Detlev Vagts, Peter Murray, Litigating The Nazi Labor Claims: The Path Not 
Taken, 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 503, 507 (2002). A treaty, adopted in 1952 placed Germany 
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Seizures, however, were ultimately terminated under the con-
dition that Germany compensate the victims of Nazi persecu-
tion in an amount based on Germany's ability to pay.28 
In 1953, the London Agreement was adopted to restore 
Germany's international creditworthiness.29 The London 
Agreement addressed claims against German governmental 
and private parties and postponed the discussion of further 
reparations payments until a final treaty.30 After 1956, the 
West German government took up reparations to individuals 
harmed by the Nazi regime, including survivors remaining in 
Germany.31 The West German government also concluded a 
substantial number of bilateral agreements with Israel and 
other countries under which it made payments in reparation 
for human rights violations during the Nazi period.32 
These measures did not directly address all of the Holo-
caust claims.33 For example, they did not address victims of the 
under an obligation to make good the damage done by Nazi persecution; the amount 
was left dependent on Germany's ability to pay. See Convention on the Settlement of 
Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 332 
U.N.T.S. 219. 
28 See also Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953,4 U.S.T. 443, 333 
U.N.T.S.3. 
29 Timothy W. Guinnane, Financial Vergangenheitsbewaltigung: The 1953 Lon-
don Debt Agreement, p. 5-6, http://www.econ.yale.edulgrowth_pdf/cdp880.pdf (last 
visited March 12, 2004). The Allies justified the payment of reparations on several 
grounds. First, German aggression had clearly triggered the conflict, and Germany 
was bound to pay the consequences of its crimes. Second, the European Allies were 
deeply in debt to each other, to their citizens, and most of all to the United States. 
Discharging their mutual debts without income from reparations appeared to be im-
possible. Third, history proved that reparations were nearly always the outcome of 
war. At the conclusion of virtually every European war, including World War I, the 
vanquished had been forced to pay the victor. [d. 
The Second World War ravaged Germany and practically destroyed its economy. The 
burden of paying reparations would have delayed Germany's recovery, perhaps for 
decades. Fears of Soviet aggression made the western Allies reluctant to impose this 
burden. Rising Cold War tensions made the revival of Germany - as a potential bar-
rier to Soviet power - a priority for western statesmen. This revival could only be 
effected by generous aid to the German economy. In 1952, leading politicians from the 
United States, France and Great Britain called a central conference of all creditors in 
London to negotiate Germany's pre- and post-war debts. On February 27, 1953, the 
London Debt Agreement was signed. About half of all demands were cancelled. The 
rest were rescheduled to allow for long-term repayment at fixed rates. [d. 
30 Detlev Vagts, Peter Murray, Litigating The Nazi Labor Claims: The Path Not 





Shirinova: Jurisdiction Over Holocaust Claims
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
164 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
Nazis' forced labor programs.34 Some former slave laborers re-
ceived compensation because they had been imprisoned in con-
centration camps, but victims subjected to forced labor by 
German companies and businesses did not.35 As a result, com-
pensation remained a live issue into the 1990s.36 
2. Only Claims Not Covered by International Treaties May Be 
Subject to Jurisdiction in the United States Courts 
To adjudicate Holocaust Era claims, the courts must find 
that these claims have not been covered by any international 
reparations treaty and have been left open for judicial resolu-
tion.37 In general, before 1996, Holocaust victims failed to win 
recovery in American courts.3S In October 1996, however, Holo-
caust survivors filed a federal class action suit in New York 
against the two largest banks in Switzerland.39 Their suit 
stemmed among other things from the defendants' alleged fail-
ure to return monies deposited to their accounts during World 
War 11.40 This action resulted in the largest settlement of a 
human rights case in the history of American litigation.41 
Payment of $1.25 billion in four installments over the course of 
three years was agreed upon.42 Since then, Holocaust Era 




37 In re: Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litigation, 129 F. Supp. 2d 
370, 378 (2001). 
38 Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg In America: Litigating The Holocaust In United 
States Courts, 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1,8(2000). 
39 In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 142. In late 1996 
and early 1997, plaintiffs filed a series of class action lawsuits against Union Bank of 
Switzerland, alleging that, before and during World War II in knowingly retaining and 
concealing the assets of Holocaust victims, accepting and laundering illegally obtained 
Nazi loot and transacting in the profits of slave labor, Swiss institutions, defendants, 
collaborated with and aided the Nazi regime in furtherance of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity. Id. 
40 Bazyler, supra note 38. 
41 In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 142. 
42 Bazyler, supra note 38. See also In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 
F. Supp. 2d at 142. 
43 Bazyler, supra note 38. "In the history of American litigation, a class of cases 
has never appeared in which so much time had passed between the wrongful act and 
the filing of a lawsuit. In contrast to the recent flood of lawsuits, only ten suits were 
filed in American courts from 1945 to 1995 stemming from damages suffered during 
the Holocaust Era. The filing of such suits at the close of the twentieth century pre-
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss1/7
2004] JURISDICTION OVER HOLOCAUST CLAIMS 165 
suits have been filed in both federal and state courts targeting 
Germany, Austria, France and Switzerland.44 Soon after the 
case was filed, the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners created a working group on Holocaust and insurance 
issues to develop a non-adversarial alternative to litigation 
(ICHEIC).45 Since the reparations program for Jewish victims 
of Nazi rule did not cover forced labor for German companies, 
lawsuits were filed in the U.S. courts against companies using 
slave labor during World War 11.46 These suits were brought 
after 1996 and were settled successfully soon after the courts 
granted jurisdiction.47 
3. Difficulties in Obtaining Jurisdiction over Defendants in 
Holocaust Era Cases 
Many Holocaust Era cases involved foreign states as de-
fendants, and U.S. courts had to grant or deny jurisdiction over 
a foreign sovereign. In several cases American courts dis-
missed claims on one or more legal grounds, including the po-
litical question doctrine, the statute of limitations, the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, international comity, lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendants, and failure to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted.48 
United States courts have generally recognized that the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity protects foreign states from 
sents the last opportunity for the elderly survivors ofthe Holocaust to have their griev-
ances heard in a court oflaw." Id. 
44 In 1997, a class action suit was filed in New York against 25 European insur-
ance carriers claiming proceeds on unpaid insurance policies. Michael J. Bazyler and 
Adrienne Scholz, J.D., Holocaust Restitution Litigation In The United States and Other 
Claims For Historical Wrongs - An Update. ACLU International Civil Liberties Re-
port, http://sdshh.com/lCLRlICLR_2003/6_bazyler.pdf(lastvisited March 12,2004). 
45Id. 
46Id. 
47 Vagts, Murray, supra note 30, referring to United States-Germany Agreement, 
Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future, July 17, 2000, U.S.-Ger., 39 I.L.M. 1298. 
"An agreement in July 2000 involving the American and German governments, other 
governments, German industry, and representatives of the plaintiffs created a fund of 
DM10 billion (nearly $5 billion). The German government and German industry con-
tributed the money to a foundation responsible for disbursal." Id. See also Bazyler, 
supra note 38. 
46 Burger-Fischer, 65 F.Supp.2d 248; Frumkin v. J. A Jones, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 
2d 370 (D.N.J. 2001); Iwanowa at 424; Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 
1994); Fishel v. BASF Group, No. 4-96-CV-10449, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21230 (S.D. 
Iowa Mar. 11, 1998). 
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being sued for actions in which they were implicated.49 For ex-
ample, in Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, the plain-
tiff filed a claim for damages suffered during his enslavement 
by the Nazis during World War II.50 The U. S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed his claim against 
Germany, concluding that Germany was immune from suit un-
der both the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the act of 
state doctrineY On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, holding that Germany as a foreign sovereign 
was immune from jurisdiction in the U.S. courts for any act 
committed before 1952.52 
The act of state doctrine, where it applies, precludes a U.S. 
court from adjudicating any case in which the plaintiffs claim 
requires the court to pass a judgment upon a foreign sover-
eign's action within its own territory. 53 Other defenses include 
the political question doctrine, forum non conveniens, and the 
statute of limitations. 54 For example, in Burger-Fischer v. De-
Gussa, the court refused jurisdiction to former slave laborers 
because of the political question doctrine.55 Similarly, the court 
rejected a claim by a woman abducted in 1942 by the Nazi 
army, transported to Germany and forced to perform heavy 
labor.56 Defendants might also have appealed to comity or fo-
49 Detlev F. Vagts, Restitution For Historic Wrongs, The American Courts And 
International Law, 92 AMJIL 232, 233 (1998). 
50 Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany & Claims Conference, 250 F.3d 1145 
(7"' Cir. 2001). 
51 Sampson, 250 F.3d at 1145. 
52 Sampson, 250 F.3d at 1145. 
53 Vagts, supra note 49. See also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of 
Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854, 1876 n.18 (1976). The doctrine of sovereign immunity differs 
from the act of state doctrine because it goes to the issue whether a foreign state can be 
forced to defend a suit in the United States, while the act of state doctrine supplies the 
rule of decision if jurisdiction is exercised over the claim. Id. 
54 "Although Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962» cautions that not all 
foreign relations issues are political questions, it is still true that the courts regard 
international matters as prima facie dangerous to handle." See Vagts, supra note 49. 
As for Statute of Limitations, see Vagts, Murrray, supra note 30."Some plaintiffs also 
cited the U.N. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73. However, nei-
ther Germany nor the United States are parties to this agreement, which in any case 
applies only to criminal prosecutions." See Id. 
55 Burger-Fischer, 65 F.Supp.2d at 250. The political question doctrine holds that 
a federal court having jurisdiction over a dispute should decline to adjudicate it if the 
case raises questions that should be addressed by the political branches of government. 
Id. 
56 Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 434. 
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rum non conveniens to persuade a U.S. court that such complex 
and remote problems should be handled in a different forum. 57 
When courts rejected these defenses and asserted jurisdic-
tion, however, the immediate threat of litigation often fostered 
expedited settlements. In many cases, the fact that a court 
accepted a claim forced defendants to settle. 58 For example, in 
Bodner u. Banque Pari bas the U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of New York held that it had jurisdiction over the 
plaintiffs' claim for the defendants' expropriation of Jewish 
customers' assets during the Nazi occupation. 59 The court held 
that jurisdiction existed in the interest of public policy.60 Al-
though the defendant banks had illegally held the funds of 
Jewish victims for decades, they surrendered these assets soon 
after the court asserted jurisdiction.61 The case settled within a 
few months under the threat of litigation and a special com-
pensation fund was established.62 
Many defendants in the Holocaust Era litigation created 
special funds to guarantee "legal peace" and deter lawsuits.63 
For example, in 1999, the German government entered into a 
settlement with representatives of Jewish organizations to re-
solve slave labor claims.64 Austria followed the German prece-
dent, agreeing to compensate former slaves and forced labor-
ers.65 As stated earlier, a special commission was created to 
develop a non-adversarial alternative to litigation related to 
57 Vagts, Murray, supra note 30. 
58 Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F.Supp.2d 117 (E.D.N.Y.2000); In re Nazi Era 
Cases Against German Defendants 198 F.R.D. 429 (D.N.J. 2000); In re: Nazi Era Cases 
Against German Defendants Litigation, 129 F.Supp. 2d 370, 378 (D.N.J. 2001); In re 
Austrian and German Bank. Holocaust Litigation, Case No. 98, Civ. 3938 
(S.D.N.Y.1999)'. . 
59 Bodner, 114 F.Supp.2d 117. 
60 Id .at 133. 
61 Id at 124. 
62 Notice to Victims of Anti-Semitic Persecution in France, Ambassade de Fanse 
in Nederland, at http://www.ambafrance-nl.orglarticle.php3?id_article=633 (last visited 
March 12, 2004). See also In re: Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litiga-
tion, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 378. 
63 Michael J. Bazyler and Adrienne Scholz, J.D., Holocaust Restitution Litigation 
In The United States and Other Claims For Historical Wrongs - An Update. ACLU 
International Civil Liberties Report, http://sdshh.comlICLRJICLR_2003/6_bazyler.pdf 
(last visited March 22, 2004). 
64 Vagts, Murray, supra note 30; Bazyler, supra note 38. 
65 Bazyler, supra note 38. 
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insurance claims.66 But not all of the claims were subject to 
special funds and commissions.67 
4. Looted Art Litigation in the United States Courts 
During World War II the Germans stole approximately 
600,000 works of art from museums and private collections 
throughout Europe.68 To date, only a handful of lawsuits have 
been filed in the United States to recover artwork looted during 
the war.69 Since each of these lawsuits addressed a specific 
work of art, none was filed as a class action.70 Thus far, the 
community of museums, galleries, and art dealers has not es-
tablished a fund similar to those created by foreign govern-
ments to compensate Holocaust victims.71 Instead, the profes-
sional art world has left each defendant holding stolen artwork 
to fend for himself.72 Thus, in Altmann the plaintiffs claim for 
recovery of her family's stolen artwork is not covered by any 
reparations or restitution program. 
B. FACTS OF THE CASE: ALTMANN v. AUSTRIA 
Maria Altmann, an American citizen, now 87, claims six 
Gustav Klimt paintings, including a portrait of her aunt, Adele 
Bloch-Bauer, commissioned in the early 1900s by Ferdinand 
Bloch, Ms. Altmann's uncle.73 Originally these paintings be-
longed to Adele, Ferdinand's wife, who died in 1925.74 She 
66 Id. 
67 Michael J. Bazyler and Adrienne Scholz, J.D., Holocaust Restitution Litigation 
In The United States and Other Claims For Historical Wrongs - An Update. ACLU 
International Civil Liberties Report, http://sdshh.comlICLRlICLR_2003/6_bazyler.pdf 
(last visited March 22, 2004). 
68 Michael J. Bazyler, Amber L. Fitzgerald, Trading With The Enemy: Howcaust 
Restitution, The United States Government, and American Industry, 28 BROOK, J. lNT'L 





73 Complaint for Damages at 7, Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (No.00-08913), 
http://www.adele.atlComplainLagainst_AustrialComplaint_against_Austria.pdf (last 
visited March 12, 2004). 
74 Id. at 8. Before she died in 1925, Adele Bloch-Bauer owned six Klimt paint-
ings: the two portraits of herself; a portrait of a friend, "Amalie Zuckerkandl;" and 
three landscapes, "Apple Tree I," "Beechwood" and "Houses in Unterach am Attersee. 
Id. 
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asked Ferdinand to donate the paintings at her death to the 
Austrian Gallery.75 The executor of Adele's estate nullified her 
request, and declared that the paintings were Ferdinand's 
property, not hers.76 Thus, Ferdinand was not bound by his 
wife's wishes.77 The Gallery was given notice of the probate 
proceedings.78 Ferdinand initially planned to honor his wife's 
request, but he failed to execute any document donating the 
paintings to the Gallery. 79 He delivered one painting to the 
Gallery in 1936.80 The other six remained in his possession un-
til Hitler's annexation of Austria in 1938.81 
Ferdinand Bloch was Jewish.82 He had given his support 
to anti-Nazi agitation before Germany annexed Austria.83 He 
fled the country to avoid persecution, leaving behind all his 
holdings, and settled in Zurich, Switzerland.84 The Gestapo 
seized his castle in Vienna, and his trove of paintings was 
looted.85 Some of these works wound up in Hitler's private col-








82 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 959. 
83 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 969. 
84 Suit over Nazi Looting Heads to Supreme Court: Klimt Paintings at Heart of 
L.A Woman's Action, at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibinlarticle.cgi?file:ldal2003/10/01lMN239635.DTL 
85 Altmann, 317 F.3d 954. 
86 Complaint for Damages at 9, Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (No.00-08913), 
http://www.adele.at/Complaint_against_AustrialComplaint_against_Austria.pdf (last 
visited March 12, 2004). 
87 Third Reich, Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia, at: 
http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilThird_Reich (last modified on 12:16, Feb. 29, 2004). 
"The Third Reich is an anglification of the German expression "Das Dritte 
Reich", and is used as a synonym for Nazi Germany. The term was introduced by Nazi 
propaganda, which counted the Holy Roman Empire as the first Reich, the 1871 Ger-
man Empire the second, and its own regime as the third. This was done in order to 
suggest a return to alleged former German glory after the perceived failure ofthe 1919 
Weimar Republic. 
The Third Reich was sometimes also referred to as the "Thousand Year Reich", 
as it was intended by its founder, Adolf Hitler, to stand for one thousand years.ld. 
The Nazi Party attempted to combine traditional symbols of Germany with 
Nazi Party symbols in an effort to reinforce the perception of them as being one and 
the same Thus the Nazi Party used the terms "Third Reich" and "Thousand Year 
Reich" to connect the allegedly glorious past to its supposedly glorious future. Initially 
Hitler's plans seemed to be well on their way to fruition. At its height, the Third Reich 
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Fiihrer, the Nazi lawyer who liquidated Bloch's estate, received 
permission from Hitler's museum director Hans Posse to add 
some of Bloch's paintings to his own personal collection.s8 
A refugee in Switzerland, Ferdinand died on November 13, 
1945, six months after the war ended.89 He had taken prelimi-
nary steps to retrieve his stolen property.90 In his last will, 
dated October 22, 1945, he revoked all prior wills and left his 
entire estate to two nieces (including plaintiff Altmann) and 
one nephew.91 He made no bequest to the Austrian Gallery.92 
Austria was an independent democratic republic until 
1938.93 In that year, the Nazis occupied and annexed Austria 
(the "Anschluss"), relying on the claim that Austria was an in-
tegral part of Germany.94 After the invasion, the Nazis enacted 
anti-Jewish laws that severely restricted the property rights of 
Jewish citizens.95 Property belonging to Jews was "Aryanized," 
i.e., given to non-Jewish individuals.96 After the war, the Sec-
ond Republic of Austria was established.97 In 1946, it declared 
that all transactions dictated by the Nazis were void.9s Yet, 
despite official Austrian policy, Altmann and her family mem-
bers recovered only one of the stolen Klimt paintings.99 
In 1947, Ferdinand's heirs retained a Vienna attorney, a 
family friend whom Ferdinand had retained not long before his 
death, to locate and retrieve property stolen from Ferdinand by 
the N azis.100 . In February 1948, the Austrian Gallery assured 
this attorney that Adele Bloch Bauer had bequeathed six Klimt 
controlled the greater part of Europe. However, due to the defeat by the Allied powers 
in World War II, the Thousand Year Reich in fact lasted only 12 years (from 1933 
through to 1945)." Id. 
88 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 960. 
89 Complaint for Damages at 11, Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (No.00-08913), 
http://www.adele.at/Complaint_against_AustrialComplaint_against_Austria.pdf (last 









98 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 959. 
99 Altmann v. Austria, Complaint Against the Republic of Austria and the Aus-
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paintings to the museum in 1925.101 The Gallery also informed 
him that Adele's husband Ferdinand had asked permission 
from the museum to keep the paintings during his lifetime. l02 
In April 1948, the Gallery asked the attorney to sign a docu-
ment donating the Klimt paintings to the museum in exchange 
for a permit to export other items of Ferdinand's estate.103 
Ms. Altmann never saw any documents related to Ferdi-
nand's estate until January 1999.104 She mistakenly believed 
that her Aunt Adele and her Uncle Ferdinand had freely do-
nated the Klimt paintings to the Austrian Gallery before the 
War. !Os She didn't know that the paintings had been stolen 
from her uncle. l06 She didn't know that it was only through the 
unauthorized "donation," purportedly made on her behalf, that 
the Austrian Gallery had claimed ownership of the paintings. l07 
She learned the truth only after 1998.108 
In that year, U.S. authorities seized two Egon Schiele 
paintings that the Austrian Government had loaned to the Mu-
seum of Modern Art because these paintings had allegedly been 
looted by the N azis.l09 Mter this seizure, the Austrian Minister 
for Education and Culture opened her ministry's archives to 
prove that no other looted artwork remained in Austria.no An 
Austrian journalist published a series of articles showing that 
Austrian museums had kept artwork extorted from exiled Jew-
ish families long after the war ended.111 In several instances -
as with the Klimt paintings from the Bloch-Bauer collection -
the origin of artwork was falsified to hide the fact that the 
101 [d. 
102 [d. at 17. 
103 [d. 





109 See United States v. Portrait of Wally, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18713 (U.S. v. 
Portrait of Wally, A Painting By Egon Schiele. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d S.D.N.Y. 
(2002) (Action brought by United States to forfeit painting on loan from Austria that 
had been looted during the Nazi era). 
110 Altmann v. Austria, Complaint Against the Republic of Austria and the Aus-
trian Gallery, page 21. 
http://www.adele.at/Complaint_against_Austria/Complaint_against_Austria.pdf. 
III Altmann v. Austria, Complaint Against the Republic of Austria and the Aus-
trian Gallery, page 21. 
http://www.adele.at/Complaint_against_Austria/Complaint_against_Austria.pdf. 
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paintings had been stolen during the war.lI2 Klimt's portrait of 
Adele Bloch-Bauer I, which was allegedly donated to the Aus-
trian Gallery in 1936, actually was transferred to the gallery in 
1941.113 A letter effecting the transfer was signed "Heil Hit-
ler."lI4 Many valuable works of art "donated" to the Gallery -
that is, extorted from their rightful owners by Austrian gov-
ernment officials after the war - were never restored to the 
owners or their heirs.ll5 
Austria admits that the paintings were illegally confis-
cated by the Nazis in 1938-1942, but contends that its right of 
ownership rests on events that occurred before and after (not 
during) World War II and most importantly under Adele's 
will.lI6 Altmann claims that since Austria received the paint-
ings from the Nazis and their Austrian accomplices, it had the 
legal and moral obligation to deliver them to Ferdinand's heirs 
upon probate of Ferdinand's will.l17 Altmann alleged that the 
Austrian Gallery violated international law by receiving prop-
erty stolen from Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer; by refusing to return 
such property to his rightful heirs; and by using deceit and du-
ress to obtain artwork that should have been restored to Ferdi-
nand's heirs during the post-war period. lIS 
Altmann, first brought suit in Austria, but laws there re-
quired her to pay fees amounting to a percentage of the prop-
erty in question which would have resulted in a $1.6 million 
112 Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1195. In January 1999, the Austrian government 
permitted this journalist to copy documents from the Gallery archives. He provided 
copies of these documents to Altmann's lawyer, and Altmann learned how the Klimt 
paintings came to be in the Austrian Gallery's possession. Id. 
113 Complaint for Damages at 20, Altmann v. Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (2001) 
(No. 00-08913), at 
http://www.adele.atlComplainLagainst_AustriaiComplaint_against_Austria.pdf 
(March 12, 2004). 
114 Id. at 21. 
115 See generally The Commission for Art Recovery web site (last visited March 12, 
2004), at http://www.comartrecovery.org/accomplishments/austrialtextlaustrial.htm. 
The Commission for Art Recovery is a public organization established to spur restitu-
tion efforts by European governments to help families whose art was wrongfully taken 
as a result ofthe policies of the Nazi Germany. Id. 
116 Petition for Cert. at 8, Altmann v. Austria, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003), at 
http://www.cpprot.netiAustria-Altman.pdf(March 12, 2004). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 36. 
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payment just to prosecute the case. lIS She qualified for a re-
duced fee but abandoned the case because it still would have 
required too much money to bring the suit.120 Instead, she 
brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District 
of California. 121 
II. THE FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND GENERAL 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RETROACTIVITY 
A. THE FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT 
Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction; 
they can hear only those cases that Congress directs and the 
Constitution permits them to hear.122 Since Altmann was filed 
in federal court, the claim it presents must fall within the class 
of cases that federal courts can hear. Defendant Austria is a 
foreign sovereign, and its status presents a challenge to estab-
lishing jurisdiction. Although the Constitution explicitly in-
cludes suits against "foreign states" within the subject 
matter jurisdiction of federal courts, until 1952, foreign sov-
ereigns enjoyed almost absolute immunity from suits in United 
States courtS.123 The State Department ordinarily requested 
immunity in all actions against friendly foreign sovereigns be-
cause the United States had impliedly waived jurisdiction over 
foreign sovereigns under the doctrine of absolute sovereign 
immunity.124 This doctrine resulted from judicial unwillingness 
to interfere with foreign affairs. 125 In 1952, however, the U.S. 
119 See Robert Greene, Suit Permitted Against Austria Over Art Allegedly Stolen 




122 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Unlike state courts of general 
jurisdiction (e.g., the Superior Courts of California), that have jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of a wide variety of lawsuits, federal jurisdiction is limited in nature. 
Federal courts only exercise the limited subject matter jurisdiction conferred by the 
Constitution and Congress. See also: Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 798 
(9th Cir. 2001); Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978). 
123 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). "For more 
than a century and a half, the United States generally granted foreign sovereigns com-
plete immunity from suit in the courts of this country." [d. 
124 "Foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the 
United States" [d. 
125 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 84 S.Ct. 923, 938 (1964). "The doctrine 
as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that 
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position changed. The State Department adopted a "restric-
tive" theory of foreign sovereign immunity.126 This theory was 
set forth in a State Department document known as the Tate 
Letter. 127 
The restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity held 
that a foreign state was immune from suits involving its sover-
eign or public acts, but had no immunity from suits stemming 
from its commercial activities.128 The State Department's new 
policy did not give courts definite standards for determining 
whether to assert jurisdiction over suits against foreign 
states.129 As a result, decisions regarding immunity were in-
consistent because they often hinged on politics or foreign pol-
icy rather than Congressional statutes.130 In 1976, Congress 
codified the theory of restrictive sovereign immunity by adopt-
ing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.131 This Act was 
adopted to assure that decisions were made on legal - not po-
litical - grounds under Due Process, and to shift the determi-
its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder 
rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community 
of nations as a whole in the international sphere." [d. 
126 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting 
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952) (reprinted in 26 Dep't of State 
Bull. 984-985 (1952) and in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 
711(1976». Tate cited the following reasons for adopting the theory of restricted im-
munity: (i) most civil law countries had already adopted it; (ii) the ~vernment of the 
United States did not clainI immunity when sued in foreign courts in contract or tort; 
and (iii) the increasing practice of engaging in commercial activities between private 
parties and foreign governments made it necessary to have their rights determined in 
the courts. 
127 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting 
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952) (cited in Alfred Dunhill of London, 
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976». 
128 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting 
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952). "It will hereafter be the Depart-
ment's policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration 
of requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity .... It is realized 
that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts but it is felt that the 
courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the executive has 
declined to do so." [d. 
129 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F. 2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Verlinden B. v., 461 U.S. at 487; Altmann, 142 F.Supp.2d at 1198. 
130 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. 
131 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1990). 
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nation of sovereign immunity from the executive to the judicial 
branch. 132 
FSIA provides the sole basis for subject matter jurisdiction 
over suits involving foreign states and their agencies.133 Under 
its provisions, foreign states are immune from jurisdiction in 
United States courts, unless one of several exceptions applies. 134 
The Act contains exceptions for certain situations, including 
those "in which rights in property taken in violation of interna-
tional law are in issue" (Section 1605(a)(3)), and in which com-
mercial activities of the foreign sovereign are carried on in the 
United States or cause a direct effect in the United States (Sec-
tion 1605(a)(2)).135 When one of these exceptions applies, the 
foreign state becomes liable to the same extent as a private in-
dividual under similar circumstances and district courts have 
original jurisdiction over the action. 136 
Ms. Altmann brought her claim under FSIA's expropria-
tion exception. That exception confers jurisdiction over claims 
against foreign governments to adjudicate rights of property 
taken in violation ofinternationallaw.137 The events giving rise 
to her claim took place before FSIA was enacted in 1976, and 
even before the Tate letter was issued in 1952.138 Naturally, 
132 Verlinden B. v., 461 u.S. at 488. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, p. 7 (1976», See 
also Mark B. Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity In The United States Courts 1976-
1986, 19 Vand. J. Transnat'l L.19 (1986). 
133 Verlinden B. V, 461 U.S. at 488. "For the most part, the Act codifies, as a mat-
ter of federal law, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. A foreign state is nor-
mally immune from the jurisdiction of federal and state courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1604, sub-
ject to a set of exceptions specified in §§ 1605 and 1607. Those exceptions include ac-
tions in which the foreign state has explicitly or impliedly waived its immunity, § 
1605(a)(1), and actions based upon commercial activities of the foreign sovereign car-
ried on in the United States or causing a direct effect in the United States, § 
1605(a)(2)." Id. 
134 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1977); see also id. §§ 1330, 1605. 
135 The other exceptions include actions for certain noncommercial torts within 
the United States, 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(5); certain actions involving maritime liens, § 
1605(b); and certain counterclaims, §1607. 
136 28 USCS § 1606 states: "As to any claim for relief with respect to which a 
foreign state is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the 
foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances ... " See also: 28 USCS § 1330(a) which states: 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to the amount in 
controversy of any non-jury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 
1603(a) of this title." 
137 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1986). 
138 Tate Letter, supra note 124, 126. 
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whether FSIA applies retroactively is the key issue in the 
Altmann case. 
B. RETROACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S 
DECISIONS 
The legal principles for deciding the retroactivity of a stat-
ute are set forth in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, et al. 139 
There the court held: 
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the 
events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether 
Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. 
If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to 
judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no 
such express command, the court must determine whether 
the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it 
would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, in-
crease a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new du-
ties with respect to transactions already completed. If the 
statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presump-
tion teaches that it does not govern . .140 
Thus, in Landgraf, the Court established a two-step ap-
proach to determine whether a statute applies to events pre-
dating its enactment.141 First, because Congress sometimes 
indicates that a statute's proper reach implies its application to 
events predating its enactment, the court must fIrst ask 
whether Congress has expressly prescribed the proper reach of 
the statute in question.142 If Congress has done so, the inquiry 
ends and the statute applies.143 Second, if Congress did not ex-
pressly permit retroactive application, the court must deter-
mine whether applying the statute to pre-enactment events 
would have an impermissible retroactive effect.l44 That is, the 
court must determine whether applying the statute would "im-
pair rights a party possessed when she acted, increase a party's 
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to 
139 Landgrafv .USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
140 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. 
141Id. 
142Id. 
143 Id. at 261. 
144 Id. at 261-262. 
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transactions already completed."145 If applying the statute 
changes the liabilities of the parties, then it would be unjust to 
impose such an unforeseeable obligation to conduct occurring 
before the effective date of the statute.146 In Landgraf the 
Court addressed jurisdictional statutes, stating that: "Applica-
tion of a new jurisdictional rule usually takes away no substan-
tive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the 
case. Present law normally governs in such situations because 
jurisdictional statutes speak to the power of the court rather 
than to the rights or obligations of the parties."147 Several 
lower courts' decisions later concluded that this statement 
permitted retroactive application of all jurisdictional statutes 
and FSIA in particular.148 
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer clari-
fied Landgraf149 Hughes Aircraft held that although a new ju-
risdictional rule usually "takes away no substantive right but 
simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case," some-
times it may create jurisdiction where none previously existed, 
and thus speak not just to the power of a particular court but to 
the substantive rights of the parties.150 Under Hughes Aircraft, 
when a jurisdictional statute affects nothing more than where 
a suit may be brought, not whether it may be brought at all, 
retroactive application is permissible. 151 If, however, it creates 
jurisdiction where none previously existed, and thus affects the 
substantive rights of the parties, then such a statute, even 
though phrased in "jurisdictional" terms, is subject to a pre-
sumption against retroactivity.152 
In light of Landgraf and Hughes, FSIA would apply in 
Altmann if 1) Congress clearly intended that it apply to events 
predating FSIA's enactment; or 2) application of FSIA would 
not change the substantive rights and responsibilities of the 
145 [d. 
146 [d. 
147 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
148 United States ex rei. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 
1995) vacated and remanded by Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex reI. Schumer, 
520 U.S. 939 (1997); Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1200; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 959. 
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parties. 153 As this Comment maintains, even if Austria confis-
cated the Altmann family's property in violation of intern a-
tionallaw, and enjoyed immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts prior to FSIA's enactment, it should not be deprived of 
this immunity under FSIA. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURTS INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND THE ALTMANN DECISION 
A. THE EXPROPRIATION EXCEPTION TO FSIA 
Altmann claims that FSIA's "expropriation exception" ap-
plies to her case and therefore the U.S. district court has juris-
diction. l54 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California, where the claim was filed, examined the application 
of this exception to FSIA.155 The expropriation exception pro-
vides: 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction 
of courts of the United States or of the States in any case ... (3) 
in which rights in property taken in violation of international 
law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged 
for such property is present in the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity carried on in the United 
States by the foreign state; or that property or any property 
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an 
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency 
or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the 
United States.(emphasis added} ... 156 
This exception has two clauses.157 The first clause refers to 
cases where the property in question or any property ex-
changed for such property is "present in the United States."158 
Because the Klimt paintings are not present in the United 
States, only the second clause applies.159 This clause has three 
requirements. First, there must be property taken in violation 
153 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. 
154 Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1197. 
155 [d. at 1202. 
156 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) 
157 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 6613 (1976). 
158 [d. 
159 Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. 
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of international law; second, this property must be owned or 
operated by a foreign state or its agency; third, the foreign sov-
ereign must engage in commercial activity in the United 
States.160 The taking of property is valid under international 
law if 1) it serves a public purpose, 2) aliens are not singled out 
for regulation by the state, and 3) compensation is made.16l 
B. FACTS SUPPORTING THE EXPROPRIATION EXCEPTION 
Altmann's argument that her family's property was taken 
in violation of international law rests on the fact that Austria 
obtained her family's paintings as a result of the Nazis' "Ary-
anization" of Ferdinand's art collection and on the fact that 
these works of art were withheld after the war. 162 Austria used 
the export permit laws to force Jews to donate artworks to the 
Austrian Gallery in exchange for export permits for other 
works. 163 This practice itself was an act in furtherance of the 
expropriations in violation of international law. l64 Altmann's 
argument that the Austrian government has engaged in com-
mercial activity in the United States rests on the Austrian Gal-
lery's use and exploitation of the family's stolen paintings.165 
160 At the jurisdictional stage, a court need not determine if property was taken in 
violation of international law if the plaintiff's claims are substantial and non·frivolous. 
[d. 
161 [d. (citing Siderman, 965 F.2d at 711-12). 
162 Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1203. The Nazis' "Aryanization" of Ferdinand's 
art collection was obviously a taking in violation of international law. It was emphati-
cally not done for a valid public purpose, but was part of a larger scheme for the anni-
hilation of European Jewry. To say this singled out "aliens" for regulation by the state 
is a gross understatement. The Nazis certainly had no desire to redress their victims' 
injuries; no payment of just compensation was ever made. [d. 
163 "After the war, the Allies sent looted artworks to the Art Collecting Point in 
Munich, Germany. Individual applicants were not permitted to retrieve this property, 
however. Instead, the artworks were returned to their country of origin, which then 
decided whether the artworks should be restored to their rightful owners. Artworks 
deemed important to Austria's heritage could not be exported without the permission of 
the Austrian government. Austria's "cultural heritage" law, enacted soon after the 
war's end, forced its citizens, typically Jews, to give up some of their artworks in order 
to obtain a government permit to export other works in their possession", at 
http://www.comartrecovery.orglaccomplishmentslaustrialtextlaustriaI.htm (last visited March 
12,2004). 
164 Petition for Cert. at 33, Altmann v. Austria, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003), at 
http://www.cpprot.netiAustria-Altman. pdf (March 12, 2004). 
See also Austria, at http://www.comartrecovery.orglaccomplishmentslaustrialtextlaustrial.htm. 
In 1998, Austria enacted a law requiring the return of artworks "donated" to federal 
museums under duress or in exchange for export permits. [d. 
165 Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1203. 
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Evidence of the exploitation and commercial activity by the 
Austrian Gallery is its published catalogs and guidebooks with 
the portrait of Altmann's aunt, Adele Block-Bauer I, on the 
covers.166 Furthermore, the Austrian Gallery accepts admission 
fees from U.S. visitors and sells memorabilia, including images 
of the looted artworks, to U.S. citizens.167 Altmann contends 
that the operation of the Austrian Gallery, including its ticket 
sales and publication of a catalogue and book containing im-
ages of her family's stolen paintings, is a commercial activity 
exempt from immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act.16s 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REASONING AND DECISION 
The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California agreed with Altmann and applied FSIA retroac-
tively.169 The court held that FSIA applied to the pre- and post-
war acts of the Nazis and the Austrian government.170 Its deci-
sion was based on the presumption that existing legal princi-
ples permitted retroactive application of FSIA.l7l Austria 
claimed absolute sovereign immunity in accordance with the 
State Department's policy prior to the issuance of the Tate Let-
ter.172 To bolster its argument, Austria cited decisions by other 
federal circuits that held that FSIA could not be applied to pre-
1952 events.173 The District Court for the Central District of 
California questioned the viability of the authorities Austria 
166 [d. at 1205. 
167 [d. 
168 Kenneth Of gang, Austria's Lawyer Urges Court to Throw Out Suit Over Plun-
dered Art, Metropolitan News Enterprise, at 
http://www.metnews.com!articles/altrn030802.htm (last visited March 12, 2004). 
169 Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215. 
170 Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 962. 
171 Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. 
172 [d. at 1187. 
173 [d at 1201. (referring to Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 
(11 th Cir. 1986), Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26 
(2nd Cir. 1988). See Carl Marks & Co., 841 F.2d at 27 ("We believe, as did the district 
court, that only after 1952 was it reasonable for a foreign sovereign to anticipate being 
sued in the United States courts on commercial transactions."); Jackson, 794 F.2d at 
1497-98 ("We agree that to give the Act retrospective application to pre-1952 events 
would interfere with antecedent rights of other sovereigns (and also with antecedent 
principles of law that the United States followed until 1952)."); Slade v. U.S. of Mexico, 
617 F. Supp. 351, 356 (D.C. 1985)."[T]he Court finds that FSIA cannot be applied ret-
roactively to this case where all the operative events occurred before 1952." 
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submitted, misinterpreting the meaning of Landgraf174 The 
district court upheld jurisdiction, concluding that FSIA does 
not affect any substantive law determining the liability of a 
foreign state and, being a jurisdictional statute, does not have 
an impermissibly retroactive effect. 175 Since the district court's 
reasoning was incorporated in the Ninth Circuit's analysis, fur-
ther discussion will address the district court's reasoning only 
through the prism of the Ninth Circuit's analysis. 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS AND DECISION IN 
ALTMANN 
A. APPLYING THE FIRST PRONG OF THE LANDGRAF TEST, THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT HELD THAT FSIA's STATEMENT OF 
PuRPOSE MANIFESTED CONGRESS' INTENT THAT FSIA BE 
RETROACTIVELY APPLIED 
In determining whether the district court properly held 
that FSIA could be applied to Austria's expropriation of the 
Altmann family's property, the Ninth Circuit examined the 
issue of FSIA's retroactivity. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit 
applied the two-prong test set forth in Landgraf The court 
first considered whether Congress had intended that FSIA 
should apply retroactively.176 The Ninth Circuit relied on dicta 
in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany. 177 The court found 
Congressional intent in the statute's statement of purpose, 
which declared that "Claims of foreign states to immunity 
should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States 
174 Altmann, 142 F. Supp. at 1200. This conclusion was later rejected by the 
Ninth Circuit, which declared that "We need not reach the broad conclusion of the 
district court that FSIA may be generally applied to events predating the 1952 Tate 
Letter." [d. 
175 [d. 
176 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 963. 
177 Princz, 26 F.3d at 1178-79. (Wald, J., dissenting on other grounds), cert. de-
nied, 513 U.S. 1121, 130 L. Ed. 2d 803, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995) Hugo Princz, a Holocaust 
survivor, sued Germany to recover damages for injuries he suffered in Nazi concentra-
tion camps. Prinz advanced tort and quasi-contract claims. The district court asserted 
subject matter jurisdiction over these claims, holding that FSIA did not apply to cases 
involving undisputed acts of barbarism committed by former outlaw nations. The 
United States Court of Appeals For The District of Columbia Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that if the FSIA 
applied, no exception to defendant's sovereign immunity existed, and even if the FSIA 
did not apply and defendant was not immune from suit, no jurisdiction could be exer-
cised over plaintiffs tort and quasi contract claims. 
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and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in 
this chapter."17s The majority interpreted Congress' use of the 
word "henceforth" to mean that "FSIA is to be applied to all 
cases decided after its enactment, i.e., regardless of when the 
plaintiffs cause of action accrued."179 Following the Princz 
court's dicta, the Ninth Circuit declared that it was possible 
that Congress intended FSIA to apply retroactively and pro-
ceeded to the second prong of the Landgraf test. ISO 
B. APPLYING THE SECOND PRONG OF THE LANDGRAF TEST, 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT HELD THAT FSIA's APPLICATION IN 
ALTMANN'S CLAIM OF WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION WAS 
NOT IMPERMISSIBLY RETROACTIVE 
Under the second prong of the Landgraf test, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that Austria could have had no reasonable 
expectation of immunity in a foreign court because the N urem-
berg trials of 1945-1946 signaled that the international com-
munity would not support immunity "to shroud the atrocities 
committed during the Holocaust."lsl Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
found that a U.S. court should apply the international law of 
takings, which would be applied in any foreign court.IS2 There-
fore, the court said, FSIA's retroactive application to the 
Altmann case would only address which court should have ju-
risdiction not whether the case could be brought at all. ls3 
The court gave three reasons for its conclusion. First, by 
the 1920s, Austria itself had adopted the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity.ls4 Austria was therefore on notice regard-
ing restrictions on immunity.ls5 Second, the cases holding FSIA 
inapplicable to pre-1952 events involved economic transactions 
entered into prior to the defendant country's acceptance of the 
restrictive principle of sovereign immunity.ls6 Third, the dis-
putes in sister circuits ruling against FSIA's retroactivity in-
178 Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170. 
179 Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170. 
1SO Altmann, 317 F.3d at 964 (citing Slade, 617 F. Supp. at 356), Jackson, 794 
F.2d 1490, Carl Marks & Co, 841 F.2d 26. 
1Sl Altmann, 317 F.3d at 967. 
182 [d. 
183 [d. 
184 [d. at 966-967. 
185 [d. at 967. 
186 [d. at 966-967. 
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volved contracts.1B7 In contract cases, courts have traditionally 
deferred to the "settled expectations" of the parties at the time 
of contracting.188 Applying FSIA retroactively in those cases 
would impair rights a party possessed at the time of contract-
ing. 189 The Ninth Circuit emphasized, however, that such pre-
sumptions do not apply to a claim of violation of international 
law.190 Thus, even if Austria expected that it would not be sued 
in a foreign court at the time it acted, its expectation would be 
unreasonable. 191 For these reasons, the court held that applica-
tion of FSIA to the pre-1952 actions of the Republic of Austria 
was not impermissibly retroactive.192 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT HELD THAT AUSTRIA'S COMMERCIAL 
ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES SUFFICED To SATISFY 
FSIA's APPLICATION 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit concurred with the district court 
in recognizing that at the jurisdictional stage, it did not need to 
decide whether the taking of property actually violated inter-
national law so long as the claim was substantial and non-
frivolous. 193 The court held that the alleged facts were suffi-
cient to conclude that Austria obtained the Altmann family's 
property in violation of international law.194 Thus, the court 
declared, the Austrian Gallery's alleged commercial activity 
involving the Altmann family's paintings was enough to justify 
jurisdiction under FSIA.195 
D. MORAL GROUNDS 
While the Ninth Circuit never said that its decision was 
based on ethical and humanitarian reasons, the language of its 
opinion is saturated with emotional appeal and empathy for 
the extraordinary suffering of the Jewish people.196 The opinion 
187 [d. at 967. 
188 [d. at 966-967. 
189 [d. at 966-967. 
190 [d. 
191 Id. 
192 [d. at 968. 
193 [d at 966-967. 
194 [d. at 968. 
195 [d. at 964. 
196 [d. at 965. 
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is animated by a horror of the hideous crimes committed by the 
Nazis - crimes that the Republic of Austria did little to re-
dress.197 The court declared that "the deprivation of private 
property, while discriminatory and indeed dehumanizing, pales 
in comparison with the horrors inflicted upon those who, unlike 
Ferdinand, were unable to escape the slavery, torture, and 
mass murder of the Nazi concentration camps."19B The Ninth 
Circuit went on to assert that "Austrians could not have had 
any expectation, much less a settled expectation, that the State 
Department would have recommended immunity as a matter of 
"grace and comity"199 for the wrongful appropriation of Jewish 
property.''200 The court decided that applying FSIA would not 
"impair rights a party possessed when he acted," because Aus-
tria would not have been entitled to immunity for its alleged 
"complicity in the pillaging and retention of treasured paint-
ings from the home of a Jewish alien who was forced to flee for 
his life."201 ffitimately, the Ninth Circuit opinion provides a 
very convincing argument to resolve the Altmann's claim based 
on strong moral grounds. 
V. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION 
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DID NOT PROVE THAT CONGRESS 
INTENDED To APPLY FSIA RETROACTIVELY 
The Ninth Circuit examined two approaches to prove its 
contention that Congress intended to apply FSIA retroactively. 
First, as discussed above, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the 
holdings of other circuits that denied FSIA retroactivity.202 It 
distinguished the cases decided by other circuits - notably Carl 
197 [d. at 968. 
198 Altmann, 317 F.3d 954. 
199 Under the case law preceding FSIA U.S. courts did not exercise jurisdiction 
over foreign sovereigns as a matter of grace and comity. See: Verlinden, 461 U.S. 480, 
486. In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 117 (Mem) U.S.(1812),Chief 
Justice Marshall concluded that the jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory "is 
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself'. In Verlinden, the Court said: "As 
The Schooner Exchange made clear, however foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of 
grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the 
Constitution." Verlinden, at. 486. 
200 Id. 
201 [d. at 965. 
202 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 964. 
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Marks,203 Jackson,204 and Slade205 - as cases that dealt, not with 
violations of international law , but with contractual disputes in 
which the substantive rights of the contracting parties would 
have been impermissibly affected by FSIA's retroactive applica-
tion.206 Second, the Ninth Circuit claimed that the courts in 
Carl Marks, Jackson, and Slade never relied, in reaching their 
decisions, on Congress' alleged failure to clearly express its in-
tent that FSIA be applied retroactively. Had they believed that 
Congress never intended retroactive application, the Ninth 
Circuit said, these courts would have concluded that FSIA 
could not be applied to events predating its 1976 enactment.207 
Instead, the Ninth Circuit noted, its sister circuits "recognized 
that FSIA would properly apply to events occurring after the 
issuance of the 1952 Tate Letter" but before 1976.208 These 
Ninth Circuit's arguments are unsatisfactory, however, to 
prove Congress' intent to apply FSIA retroactively.209 
The Ninth Circuit relied only on the District of Columbia 
Circuit's Princz dicta in determining that FSIA could be ap-
plied retroactively to Holocaust Era claims.21o But, in the re-
cently decided case of Joo v. Japan, the District of Columbia 
Circuit reversed its position and rejected its dicta in Prinz, 
holding that FSIA could not be applied to pre-1952 events.2l1 In 
Joo, the court held that a foreign sovereign justifiably expected 
any suit filed in a U.S. court before 1952 to be dismissed unless 
it consented to the suit.212 The Joo case did not concern a con-
tractual dispute, but involved a claim by women alleging that 
between 1931 and 1945 the Japanese government, in a flagrant 
violation of international law, forced them to serve as "comfort 
women" - a euphemism for sex slaves.213 Despite the Ninth 
203 Carl Marks & Co., 841 F.2d 26. 
204 Jackson, 794 F.2d 1490. 
205 Slade, 617 F. Supp. 35l. 
206 See supra p. 24. 
207 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 966-967. 
208 [d. 
209 Courts held that FSIA cannot be applied retroactively in recent cases dealing 
with human rights violations and claims stemming from the Holocaust Era. See 
Sampson, 250 F.3d at 1150, Garb, 72 Fed. Appx. 850, Whiteman v. Federal Republic of 
Austria, 2002 WL 31368236 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), Abrams v. Societe Nationale des 
Chemins de Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173 (2nd Cir. 2003). 
210 Princz, 26 F.3d 1166. 
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Circuit's position, other Circuit Courts generally agreed that 
Congress did not intend to apply FSIA retroactively, no matter 
whether the issue in question was a contract dispute or a viola-
tion of international law . 
The Ninth Circuit virtually admitted that it could not pass 
the first prong of the Landgraf test. Its opinion declared: "As-
suming, without deciding, that, ... Congressional intent to al-
low application of FSIA to pre-enactment facts is not manifest 
in the statutory language, we turn to the second prong of the 
Landgraf test [to determine] whether applying FSIA would 
'impair rights a party possessed when he acted."214 The Ninth 
Circuit premised its ruling on the second prong of the retroac-
tivity analysis rather than the first.215 In doing so, it ultimately 
dodged an attempt to prove that Congress intended retroactive 
application of FSIA. 
B. THE SECOND PRONG OF THE LANDGRAF TEST DOES NOT 
PERMIT RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF FSIA IN ALTMANN 
The Ninth Circuit's decision directly conflicts with hold-
ings of the United States Supreme Court, the legislative his-
tory of FSIA, the history of sovereign immunity in the United 
States, and the position of the Executive Branch in matters 
concerning foreign relations.216 Addressing the second prong of 
the Landgraf test, the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that 
Austria could not have had a settled expectation of sovereign 
immunity before 1952. Austria's adoption of the theory of re-
strictive immunity in its own courts before 1952 would not 
have precluded it from asserting absolute immunity in other 
countries.217 Whether a foreign state is entitled to immunity 
from suit in the United States has never depended on the law 
of the foreign state.218 Throughout the 1960s, the U.S. contin-
ued to invoke absolute immunity in countries that followed 
that theory, even though it had applied restrictive immunity 
214 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 964. 
215 [d .. 
216 Brief For The United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers, Altmann v. Austria, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(N 0.03-13) at http://www.usdoj.gov/osglbriefsl2003/3mer/lamil2003-00 13.mer .amLhtml 
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principles since 1952.219 Austria was therefore entitled to sov-
ereign immunity from claims of expropriation in U.S. courts -
at least until FSIA's passage in 1976.220 Clearly, until the issu-
ance of the Tate letter, Austria was not even on notice about 
restrictions on sovereign immunity in the United States.221 
Thus, before 1952, when the Tate Letter announced the United 
States' adoption of the doctrine of restrictive immunity, a for-
eign sovereign would have justifiably expected any suit filed in 
a U.S. court to be dismissed. 
It is true that the Nuremberg trials signaled "that the in-
ternational community and particularly the United States 
would not have supported a broad enough immunity to shroud 
the atrocities committed during the Holocaust." 222 The United 
States never would have supported immunity for atrocities, but 
it is questionable whether U.S. courts would have granted ju-
risdiction. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that: 
Because a United States court would apply the international 
law of takings, which presumably would be applied in any 
foreign court, the application of FSIA to the facts of this case 
"merely addresses which court shall have jurisdiction" and 
thus "can fairly be said merely to regulate the secondary con-
duct of litigation and not the underlying primary conduct of 
the parties.223 
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning is incorrect because it is 
based on the presumption that a United States court would 
hear the case. It is self-evident that before a court can apply 
any law, the case in question must be properly before it. No 
authority supports a contention that the United States courts 
exercised jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns before 1952. 
The Ninth Circuit failed to consider that FSIA is not sim-
ply a jurisdictional statute. The application of this statute may 
change the rights and responsibilities of parties, making appli-
cation of FSIA in Altmann impermissibly retroactive. In Ver-
219 [d. 
220 [d. 
221 [d. "The expropriation exception very clearly did not exist in 1952 and, indeed, 
was a new development in the doctrine of sovereign immunity when FSIA was enacted 
24 years later." [d. 
222 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 967 (citing Princz, 26 F. 3d at 1196). 
223 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 967. 
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linden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, the United States Su-
preme Court addressed FSIA's application and held that it does 
not merely concern access to the federal courtS.224 Rather, the 
Court stressed that FSIA governs the types of actions for which 
foreign sovereigns may be held liable in a court in the United 
States.225 Specifically, FSIA codifies the standards governing 
foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of substantive federal 
law, and applying those standards will require interpretation 
of numerous points of federallaw. 226 In light of Verlinden, ap-
plication of FSIA's expropriation exception to events that oc-
curred prior to 1952, would impose new obligations upon for-
eign sovereigns such as Austria. 
In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex Rel. Schumer, 
the Court explained that "the fact that courts often apply newly 
enacted jurisdiction-allocating statutes to pending cases merely 
evidences certain limited circumstances failing to meet the 
conditions for our generally applicable presumption against 
retroactivity, not an exception to the rule itself ... "227 This quote 
demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit's understanding of statu-
tory retroactivity conflicts with that of the Court in Hughes.228 
Unless the Court changes its opinion, the Ninth Circuit will be 
deemed incorrect in holding that FSIA applies in Altmann. 
Austria also had a legitimate expectation of immunity 
from suits in U.S. courts based on the political climate in 
Europe before and after World War 1I.229 After 1945, the 
United States' defense of Austrian sovereignty triggered one of 
the first diplomatic battles of the Cold War.230 From 1946 to 
1955, the United States continuously pressed the Soviet Union 
to end its occupation of Austria and to recognize Austria's sov-
ereignty.231 Such protection may have raised a legitimate ex-
224 Verlinden, 461 u.s. 480. 
225 Id. 
226Id. 
227 Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. at 951. 
226 Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. at 950. The Court specifically stated that "the 
Ninth Circuit held that, absent a clear statement of congressional intent, there is a 
strong presumption in favor of retroactivity for jurisdictional statutes .... The Ninth 
Circuit simply misread our decision in Landgraf, for the only "presumption" mentioned 
in that opinion is a general presumption against retroactivity." ld. 
229 Petition for Cert. at 16, Altmann v. Austria, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003), at 
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pectation of immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 
"Given the Cold War's history, it is inconceivable that the 
United States would have advocated in 1948 that Austria not 
enjoy sovereign immunity in United States courts - especially 
on the subject of reparations, which was at the heart of the So-
viet Union's belligerence toward Austria at the time.''232 Sub-
jecting Austria to U.S. civil suits at that time would have inter-
fered with the United States' determined foreign policy of sup-
porting the emerging post-war democracies and holding back 
Soviet expansion.233 
In sum, based on facts, FSIA's legislative history, and well 
established legal principles, FSIA's retroactive application in 
Altmann is impermissible. Since the Ninth Circuit's view of 
FSIA's retroactive application in general is incorrect, the appli-
cability of the expropriation exception is irrelevant. The moral 
grounds, however, to adjudicate the Altmann case remain un-
questionable and deserve special attention. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In all likelihood, the Ninth Circuit was fully aware of the 
challenges to retroactive application of FSIA. Nevertheless, 
the court chose to assert jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Altmann is a morally correct decision based on improper 
legal grounds. This case arose from Holocaust atrocities, and it 
would be moral and just to hear it on the merits. If the Su-
preme Court denies jurisdiction over Austria in Altmann, its 
decision will become res Judicata. 234 Hence, it will be impossi-
ble to reopen this case in any federal court under FSIA, Austria 
will retain the paintings that Nazi agents stole from the 
Altmann family, and Maria Altmann will never have her day in 
court. 
In the interests of public policy, it is necessary to address 
Altmann's claim and resolve other Holocaust Era cases. The 
United States tried to halt Nazi atrocities during the Second 
232 Id. 
233 [d. 
234 res judicata (rayz judy-cot-ah) n. Latin for "the thing has been judged," mean-
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World War. After Hitler's regime was destroyed, it sought to 
rectify the enormous wrongs done by the Nazis and their ac-
complices. Resolving the remaining Holocaust Era cases will 
demonstrate to the world that the United States is still devoted 
to fighting genocide and will not tolerate injustice. Resolving 
this dilemma would require joint efforts the legislature, judici-
ary and public organizations. 
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